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STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES: 
BEYOND THE EFFICIENCY-CONSENSUS TRADEOFF 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines how managers make strategic decisions efficiently and simultaneously build 
the consensus often required to implement decisions successfully.   The findings suggest that 
groups employed two critical processes – one substantive/cognitive and the other 
symbolic/political – in order to achieve high levels of both efficiency and consensus.  On the 
substantive dimension, they gradually structured complex problems by making a series of 
intermediate choices about particular elements of the decision.  On the symbolic dimension, they 
took steps to preserve the legitimacy of the decision-making process.  
 
Keywords:  Decision-making, Top management teams, Conflict, Consensus, Legitimacy 
 
 3 
Many scholars contend that successful organizational performance requires both efficient 
decision-making and effective implementation (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Janis, 1989; 
Murnighan & Mowen, 2002; Nutt, 1993; Shull, Delbecq, & Cummings, 1970).   Efficient 
decision making means that the process unfolds smoothly, and that managers select a course of 
action in a timely manner (Eisenhardt, 1989; Harrison, 1999; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret 
1976; Trull, 1967). Effective implementation means that managers carry out the selected course 
of action, and meet the objectives established during the decision process (Andrews, 1987; Dean 
& Sharfman, 1996).  Scholars contend that managers must build consensus, defined as common 
understanding and commitment, in order to implement decisions successfully (Andrews, 1987; 
Bourgeois, 1980; Bower & Doz, 1979; Child, 1972; Drucker, 1954; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990).  
In sum, in order for firms to perform well, managers must make high quality decisions in an 
efficient manner, and simultaneously build consensus in order to facilitate implementation.   
Although scholars contend that effective performance requires both efficiency and 
consensus, much empirical evidence indicates that managers need to make tradeoffs when 
leading decision processes.  In fact, scholars often argue that efforts to build consensus decrease 
efficiency, while attempts to enhance efficiency inhibit the development of understanding and 
commitment (Amason, 1996; George, 1980; Hickson, Wilson, Cray, Mallory, & Butler, 1986; 
Janis, 1972; Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986; Vroom & Yetton, 1973).   Thus, the decision-
making literature presents a puzzle.  It suggests that successful firm performance requires an 
efficient decision process and effective implementation, but it does not explain how managers 
can achieve both outcomes simultaneously.  Therefore, this hypothesis-generating study 
addresses the following question: How do managers make decisions in an efficient manner and 
build the consensus often required to implement those decisions successfully?  
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
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Several prominent decision-making researchers (George, 1980; Janis, 1989) have 
proposed models of the multiple tradeoffs that managers encounter as they make decisions.   
These models articulate a tradeoff between “the need for acceptability, consensus, and support” 
and the “expenditure of precious time and other policymaking resources” (George, 1980, p. 2).  
Two streams of research support this contention that managers will find it difficult to achieve 
efficiency and consensus simultaneously.  One stream focuses on behavioral dimensions of the 
process, including participation, conflict, and politics.  A second stream focuses on cognitive 
process dimensions such as the modes of alternative evaluation and analysis. According to both 
research streams, the factors that promote efficiency tend to reduce consensus, and vice versa.   
Many scholars have argued that subordinate participation leads to higher commitment 
and understanding (Kim & Mauborgne, 1991; Tannebaum & Schmidt, 1958; Vroom & Yetton, 
1973; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990).  By contrast, other scholars asserted that participation 
decreases efficiency (George, 1980; March & Olsen, 1976; Vroom & Yetton, 1973).   For 
instance, one study found that CEOs who made fast decisions consulted their management 
teams, but “focused on obtaining advice from one or two of the firm’s most experienced 
executives” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 559).  Moreover, “the CEO was always in charge, and acted as 
something of a dictator” (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988, p. 830).  
Scholars have also found that debates tend to decrease efficiency (George, 1980; Janis, 
1972; Schweiger, et al., 1986), and that conflict leads to process interruptions and delays 
(Hickson, et al., 1986; Mintzberg, et al., 1976).  By contrast, others proposed that disagreement 
may enhance consensus.   Kim and Mauborgne (1997) asserted that individuals perceive decision 
processes to be fair, and therefore, commit to decisions if they can “refute the merits of one 
another’s ideas and assumptions” (Kim & Mauborgne, 1997, p. 69).  Amason (1996) 
distinguished between two forms of conflict: cognitive (task-oriented) and affective 
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(interpersonal).  Though he did not provide conclusive evidence, Amason hypothesized that 
groups that encourage cognitive conflict, while avoiding affective conflict, achieve higher 
commitment and understanding.  According to this body of work, disagreement may slow the 
pace down, but if managers avoid personal friction, it can enhance consensus.  
Studies have also found that politics decreases efficiency (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; 
Hickson, et al., 1986; Janis, 1989; Mintzberg, et al., 1976).  These scholars argued that, “it takes 
time, energy, and effort to engage in attempts at intra-organizational influence” (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 
321).  On the other hand, seeking allies and lobbying others may be constructive, particularly 
with respect to building commitment and understanding (Baldridge, 1971; Bower, 1970; 
Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1992; Sapolsky, 1972).  Politics can help generate support for projects, 
and may persuade others of the merits of a decision.  Overall, this stream of research suggests 
that participation, conflict, and politics all may impede managers from making timely decisions, 
yet these behaviors can foster consensus.   
The second stream of research infers that comprehensive alternative evaluation and 
formal analytical procedures foster consensus, but decrease efficiency.  Scholars have argued 
that a thorough analysis of multiple alternatives slows the decision process (Frederickson & 
Mitchell, 1984; Janis, 1972; Schweiger, et al., 1986).  Eisenhardt’s work (1989) suggests that the 
mode of alternative evaluation matters more than the number of options.  She asserted that a 
breadth-not-depth approach enhanced efficiency.  In particular, faster decision makers 
“developed many alternatives, but only thinly analyzed them” (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 
22).  Moreover, they analyzed alternatives simultaneously, rather than sequentially.  By contrast, 
studies have shown that an in-depth analysis of a small set of alternatives fosters consensus.   
These scholars argued that groups should scan many options, but they must perform a thorough 
evaluation of a few of the most attractive alternatives in order to build commitment (Amason, 
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1996; George, 1980; Janis & Mann, 1977).  These findings imply that a breadth-then-depth 
strategy may foster consensus, while a breadth-not-depth strategy maximizes efficiency.   
Similarly, scholars have argued that formal analysis slows down the decision process.  
Eisenhardt (1989) found that fast decision makers rely on “real-time” information gathered by 
continuous environmental scanning, while slow decision makers rely on data from formal 
planning and budgeting systems.  Others also argued that formal analysis inhibits efficiency 
(Bhide, 1994; Frederickson & Mitchell, 1984).  On the other hand, Bower (1970) stressed that 
formal analytical procedures may provide a means of educating executives about a project and 
acquiring their support.  He found that managers utilize formal techniques because “they must 
defend their judgments to top management in financial terms” (Bower, 1970, p. 309).  Others 
found that formal analysis may help to persuade others of a proposal’s merits (Langley, 1990; 
Sapolsky, 1972).  In sum, formal analysis may decrease efficiency, but it can enhance consensus 
when used to justify and “sell” a decision to others in the firm. 
These two streams of research, summarized in Table 1, imply that managers must make 
tradeoffs between achieving efficiency and consensus.  While acknowledging potential tradeoffs, 
scholars continue to contend that successful firms must achieve high levels of both efficiency 
and consensus.    They argue that efficient decision making enhances firm performance because 
it facilitates adaptation to rapidly changing environmental conditions (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Harrison, 1999; Rajagopalan, Rasheed, & Datta, 1993; Trull, 1967).  On the other hand, 
inefficient decision-making limits opportunities for learning and improvement, while providing 
competitors with opportunities to establish first-mover advantages (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Similarly, 
scholars propose that consensus increases performance by enhancing a firm’s ability to 
implement decisions (Andrews, 1987; Bower & Doz, 1979; Child, 1972; Drucker, 1954; Quinn, 
1980; Schweiger, et al., 1986; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990).  They argue that consensus promotes 
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the cooperation and coordination required to implement decisions successfully.   While these 
scholars contend that managers should achieve both efficiency and consensus, they have not 
presented research that explains how managers can accomplish this. If anything, prior research 
suggests that efforts to improve one element of decision-making performance will undermine 
improvement along other dimensions.  That puzzle motivates this study’s central research 
question:  How do managers make decisions efficiently and simultaneously build the consensus 
often required to implement those decisions successfully?   
Insert Table 1 about here 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 I chose to conduct an inductive study for several reasons.  To answer the research 
question, I felt that it was important to identify subtle differences in the timing and sequence of 
key activities throughout the decision process, and to examine how they affected a group’s 
ability to reach closure.  I also wanted to identify critical junctures during a decision process, and 
to understand what influenced people’s behaviors and shaped their perceptions at these times.   
These issues seemed important when trying to explain how managers achieved efficiency and 
consensus simultaneously.  Prior research had not addressed these issues adequately, and thus, 
did not appear to offer clear, compelling predictions regarding the research question.   
The multi-method field study design draws upon qualitative and quantitative evidence.  I 
selected this approach given that “a how or why question is being asked about a contemporary 
set of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 1994, p. 9).   This research 
design has several distinctive features.  First, I employed a systematic sample selection process 
to insure that the decisions were similar along multiple dimensions.  The sample consists of 10 
decisions across 3 subsidiaries of a firm operating almost entirely in one industry.   This design 
provides controls for industry structure as well as the internal structural context (Bower, 1970).   
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I also controlled for situational factors such as the level of uncertainty and novelty in each 
decision (Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers, 1998).   These controls, not included in many 
studies, bolster the internal validity of this research.  In addition, I collected qualitative and 
quantitative data from many informants across multiple organizational levels.  Two readers 
analyzed and coded the qualitative data.  These methods enhance reliability and construct 
validity by providing “converging lines of inquiry” (Yin, 1994, p. 92).   
Sample 
The sample consists of 10 strategic decisions made by managers at three subsidiaries of 
Military Engineering Inc. (MEI).  The three business units are: Naval Warfare, Vehicle Systems, 
and Advanced Electronics.  The corporation competes almost exclusively in the defense industry, 
and has performed exceptionally in recent years.    To select the sample, I asked each business 
unit’s senior executives to generate a list of strategic decisions made within the past 18 months.   
The study focused on recent decisions in order to enhance the accuracy of retrospective reporting 
(Huber & Power, 1985).  I defined “strategic” decisions as important choices that:  
• had a significant expected impact on future firm performance (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 
1988; Mintzberg, et al., 1976);  
• involved multiple functional organizations (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988);  
• represented a significant commitment of financial, physical, or human resources (Bower, 
1970; Mintzberg, et al., 1976);  
• and exhibited high complexity (Mintzberg, et al., 1976; Schweiger, et al., 1986).   
In a one-hour group meeting, the business unit managers and I discussed whether each 
decision met these criteria.  In total, this process generated 14 candidates for inclusion in the 
study.   Next, the chief executive and all direct reports completed a survey, with 7-point Likert-
type scales, that evaluated the following situational characteristics of each candidate: 
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• threat/crisis (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Papadakis, et al., 1998; Rajagopalan, et al., 1993)  
• uncertainty (Mintzberg, et al., 1976; Papadakis, et al., 1998; Rajagopalan, et al., 1993) 
• novelty (Hickson, et al., 1986; Mintzberg, et al.,1976; Papadakis, et al., 1998)  
• time pressure (Papadakis, et al., 1998; Rajagopalan, et al., 1993; Vroom & Yetton, 1973)  
I selected these four characteristics because recent studies demonstrated that these factors 
affect the nature of decision processes (Hickson, et al., 1986; Papadakis, et al., 1998; 
Rajagopalan, et al., 1993).    Table 2 describes the survey utilized to measure these four 
situational factors.  Note that the eta scores all exceed 0.20.  This indicates a substantial amount 
of agreement within each group of decision makers, and therefore, allows for the creation of a 
decision-level score for each question (Amason, 1996; Florin, Giamartino, Kenny, & 
Wandersman, 1990; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999).  The alphas range from 0.75 to 0.80, 
indicating that composite variables may be created based upon the responses to the multi-item 
survey instruments, and that these composite scores will generate reliable measures of each 
construct (Frederickson & Mitchell, 1984; Nunnally, 1967; Papadakis, et al., 1998). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
In total, 145 respondents provided data regarding the 14 candidates (10.4 respondents per 
decision).  I discarded the decision(s) in each subsidiary that exhibited the lowest levels of threat, 
uncertainty, novelty, and time pressure, because I wanted to study the most difficult, non-routine 
decisions made in this firm.   The final sample consists of at least 3 decisions per subsidiary and 
10 decisions overall.  Table 3 provides a brief description of each decision in the sample.   
Insert Table 3 about here 
Data Collection 
 After selecting the sample, I conducted separate 90-minute interviews with 78 
informants, for an average of 7.8 informants per decision.  I selected the informants by asking 
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senior executives to identify the key participants in each decision process, and by asking those 
individuals to identify others that also were involved in the decision.  I did not focus exclusively 
on top team members as many studies have (Amason, 1996; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Knight, et al., 1999).   Instead, I gathered data from individuals across four organizational levels, 
since studies indicate that the processes unfold across multiple levels (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 
1983).  To insure accurate data collection, I taped and transcribed all interviews, and adhered to 
the “24 Hour Rule” for recording my notes (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988).  I employed several 
tactics to counteract retrospective reporting biases.  I interviewed multiple informants per 
decision, provided confidentiality, and cross-checked their recollections against each and against 
company documents.  In addition, I asked the informants to review key documents prior to the 
interviews in order to refresh their memories (Huber & Power, 1985; Yin, 1994).  
 I employed the three-stage Critical Decision Method for conducting the interviews 
(Klein, Calderwood, & Macgregor, 1989).  First, I obtained an unstructured account of the 
decision process.  Second, I constructed a timeline by recording important dates as well as the 
sequence and duration of key events.  Moreover, I inquired about important cognitive events 
such as key turning points in people’s thoughts and perceptions. Finally, I employed a series of 
probes to learn more about process characteristics such as the mode of alternative evaluation 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Janis, 1972) and the use of analogies (Klein, 1998; Neustadt & May, 1986).  
 Each informant responded to a survey upon completion of all interviews.  This survey 
measured efficiency and consensus.  Because the same individuals provided data about the 
dependent and independent variables, it’s possible that people offered biased recollections of the 
process.  However, the use of many independent informants, as well as other elements of the 
interviewing technique, alleviated this potential bias. The high level of agreement among the 
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informants (indicated by the eta scores all above 0.20) supports this contention.   When 
interviewed, individuals did not know which outcomes I would measure.  In addition, the 
consensus variable included an indirect measure of common understanding.  As a result, 
individuals did not report the level of consensus for each decision, but instead, I derived it from 
an evaluation of each group’s responses.   When I presented these findings to the managers, they 
were surprised at the level of consensus for some decisions.   Most importantly, I re-examined 
these decisions one year later, and used document analysis, rather than interview or survey data, 
to evaluate the effectiveness of each implementation process. 
Consistent with past research, I defined consensus as a multiplicative function of 
understanding and commitment (Dess, 1987; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990).  Commitment 
represents the extent to which people support the decision, and are willing to cooperate in its 
implementation.  Understanding means that managers have a common comprehension of the 
decision rationale (Amason, 1996). This study defines efficiency more broadly than decision 
speed (Eisenhardt, 1989; Schilit & Paine, 1987).  Decision speed refers to process duration, 
defined as the period from “first reference of a deliberate action” to “the time at which a 
commitment to act is made” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 549).  In short, maximizing speed means 
minimizing duration. Two problems exist with this concept. First, it’s not necessarily appropriate 
to compare durations across different decisions.  Second, duration implies a clear starting and 
ending point, which managers found nearly impossible to identify in this study.   
In this study, efficiency refers to the “prudent management of time and other 
policymaking resources” (George, 1980, p. 2).  It means that managers employed the resources, 
and engaged in the number of process iterations, necessary to make a decision in a timely and 
cost effective manner.  I developed a new ten-item survey to measure efficiency.  Five questions 
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asked managers to examine different types of process iterations, such as the reconsideration of 
alternatives and the revision of goals, and to indicate whether they engaged in an optimal number 
of iterations (Janis, 1972; Mintzberg, et al., 1976).   The other five questions measured whether 
they employed different types of resources prudently (George, 1980).   Table 4 describes each 
survey measure.  Once again, the eta scores exceed 0.20, thereby justifying the aggregation of 
individual responses to decision-level scores.  The alphas range from 0.80 to 0.91, indicating that 
composite variables may be created based upon the responses to the multi-item survey.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
Data Analysis 
With the survey data, I utilized principal components analysis (PCA) to generate 
decision-level scores for efficiency and commitment.  PCA generated more reliable data 
composites than the traditional technique of averaging the responses to each question.  The 
averaging technique implicitly would assign equal weights for each survey item.  Instead, PCA 
identified the “optimal” weights to be utilized when forming composites (Afifi & Clark, 1993).     
I computed decision-level understanding scores using the “distance score” method 
(Amason, 1996; Dess, 1987; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990).  In the survey, managers allocated 
points among six categories of concerns to indicate the relative importance of different concerns 
that influenced the decision.   For each decision, I computed the standard deviation of the points 
assigned to each category, and added the standard deviations across all categories.  This 
calculation measured the lack of shared understanding among decision makers.  To measure 
common understanding, I simply subtracted this “distance score” from a constant.   Finally, I 
constructed the consensus measure by standardizing the decision-level scores for commitment 
and understanding, and multiplying them together (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990).    
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For the interview data, I developed a coding scheme that enabled me to analyze the 
transcripts, and to identify and classify process characteristics.  Coding proceeded in two phases.  
The first phase consisted of codes assigned to sections of transcript.  The codes identified key 
events, phases, and group interactions during the decision process.  For instance, the “Alt” code 
identified the generation of an alternative, and the “Cont” code referred to the description of a 
contingency plan.  In the second phase, I assigned codes to each decision process as a whole.  
These codes identified the strategies and techniques employed in each process.  To assign these 
codes, I reviewed the previously coded transcripts as well as company documents.  For example, 
the “Dev” code indicated the presence of a Devil’s Advocate during the process.   In order to 
assign this code, 3 or more transcripts had to provide evidence of this technique. For the second 
phase, I created a checklist with a complete set of decision-level codes, and marked the checklist 
to indicate whether managers employed particular strategies or techniques during that process. 
A second reader coded three of the ten decisions studied. I took several steps to facilitate 
the coding process for this individual.  I furnished the second reader with detailed written 
definitions of each code, discussed each definition with him, and then revised the coding scheme 
in order to clarify points of confusion.  I also provided the reader with written descriptions of the 
industry and the firm, profiles of the key individuals involved, and definitions of acronyms and 
terms mentioned during the interviews.  After coding the first three decisions, I evaluated the 
reliability of the coding scheme.  Inter-reader reliability was defined as the percentage of 
agreements between the two readers (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  For the first phase of the 
coding scheme, an agreement consisted of the same code being applied to a particular passage of 
transcript.  For the second phase, I recorded an agreement if the two readers placed a check mark 
next to the same category on the checklist.   Inter-reader reliability for the first three decisions 
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equaled 71%.  Given this evidence of the reliability of the coding scheme, I analyzed the 
remainder of the decisions without the assistance of the second reader.  
Finally, I searched for relationships between process characteristics (measured by the 
coding scheme) and the outcome variables (measured with survey data).   To do so, I 
dichotomized the scores for efficiency and consensus into low and high categories based upon 
the median value of each variable (Bourgeois, 1980).   This placed each decision into one of four 
categories (high/high, high/low, low/high, and low/low).  In my analysis, I recorded the number 
of decisions in each category that possessed particular process characteristics.  This enabled me 
to identify relationships between process characteristics and the outcome variables, and to 
generate propositions regarding how managers achieve efficiency and consensus simultaneously. 
OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 
In this sample, the groups did not always achieve efficiency at the expense of consensus, 
or vice versa.   In three cases, they achieved high levels of efficiency and consensus.  Others 
achieved poor results along both dimensions, or encountered mixed results.  Figure 1 lists the 
decisions that fell into each category after I dichotomized the scores for the dependent variables.  
It also provides the mean values of efficiency and consensus for the decisions in each quadrant.  
Note that business unit was not confounded with decision categorization.  Each business unit has 
one decision in the “high/high” category and one decision in the “low/low” category.   
Insert Figure 1 about here 
As noted earlier, I re-examined these decisions one year after I conducted the field 
research.  I reviewed many private and public documents about the implementation efforts, and 
coded each implementation as a positive, mixed, or negative outcome. The MOD, CVP, ALL, 
and NEW decisions resulted in positive outcomes such as new contracts, increased revenues, and 
productivity improvements.  The LEV, ORG, and SOF decisions encountered substantial 
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implementation problems including cost overruns, dismantled alliances, and lost contracts.   The 
other decisions achieved mixed results.  These findings suggest that efficiency and consensus 
were positively related to implementation success. The second coder also evaluated each 
implementation based upon document analysis.  We agreed on 9 of the 10 evaluations.     
The remainder of this paper presents a series of propositions regarding how some groups 
achieved efficiency and consensus simultaneously.   First, the paper describes three propositions 
associated with the cognitive dimension of the decision process.   These propositions concern 
how groups generated and evaluated alternatives, and how they selected a course of action.  
Then, I turn to the political aspect of the group process.  These propositions address how 
managers tried to enhance the legitimacy of their decision-making processes, and how others 
perceived these efforts.  I conclude the paper by presenting a conceptual framework that attempts 
to explain how groups achieve both efficiency and consensus.  I generated this framework 
inductively based upon the propositions that emerged from the data analysis. 
COGNITIVE DIMENSION 
 The results suggest that groups attained greater efficiency and consensus if they made a 
series of small but critical choices during the process, rather than focusing entirely on the final 
selection of a course of action.  These choices concerned the decision criteria, the elimination of 
options over time, and the specific events upon which the final choice was contingent. 
Decision Criteria 
In many decisions, people staked out positions quickly, and became entrenched in those 
positions.   Then, the groups found it difficult to reconcile divergent views, overcome obstacles, 
and avoid impasse.  The more effective groups made problems more tractable as a means of 
generating progress.  They made a series of critical choices at various points during the process.  
For example, they chose well-defined criteria before analyzing and debating a set of alternatives.        
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To illustrate, consider the example of the ALL decision at the Naval Warfare Division.  
In this case, managers tried to select one or more strategic alliance partners for a major new U.S. 
Navy program.  The chief executive sensed that people had loyalties and biases toward various 
potential teammates.  He wanted to avoid an emotional confrontation between opposing camps.  
Therefore, he advocated the development of an explicit set of criteria for evaluating each option: 
“I don’t think any of us woke up one day and said, golly, this is the way that we 
have to approach this.  I think we gradually reached that point after struggling and 
not finding an easy answer to a very complicated question.  We said, ok, the 
smartest way to approach this would probably be to identify these criteria that are 
important to us in a teaming relationship.  The mission was to try to remove as 
much of that bias as we could, recognizing that it will never be gone.  But by 
forcing people to take each of these factors and discuss them, we felt that we 
could at least force people to render an honest perspective, or precipitate an 
honest debate among different individuals in the room. But in order to get 
everybody on the same baseline, we decided that we had to define each one of 
these factors or criteria.”      
One of the other process facilitators described how they used the well-defined and 
stable set of criteria to resolve disputes that arose during the decision process: 
“What we had to do in a number of cases was to bring people back to the definitions 
and the parameters. That was very helpful at times, because people would be arguing 
something on a particular aspect and we had to jump in and say that doesn’t really 
apply here. People were willing to follow those guidelines, which again takes us 
back to the importance of defining the criteria clearly up front.” 
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While these process facilitators maintained a stable set of criteria, low efficiency/consensus 
groups either never tried to define criteria explicitly, or the criteria became ambiguous as the 
groups revisited options repeatedly.   Low levels of efficiency and consensus didn’t result from a 
lack of multiple criteria.  In fact, all groups considered many factors.   However, groups fared 
poorly when the criteria were ambiguous or changed frequently during the process.   I coded all 
ten decisions, and found a pattern linking efficiency and consensus with criteria definition.   
Proposition #1: Managers achieve higher levels of efficiency and consensus when 
they establish well-defined and stable decision criteria prior to analyzing and 
debating alternative courses of action.   
Tables 5 identifies the number of decisions in which managers established well-defined 
criteria prior to debating alternatives, and demonstrates that this approach typically resulted in 
greater efficiency and consensus. In particular, note that groups employed this practice in all 
three of the high efficiency/high consensus decisions, but in none of the low efficiency/low 
consensus cases.   The table reports similar data for all propositions presented in this paper; in 
addition, Table 6 provides further detail regarding each proposition.   
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
Explicit definition of evaluation criteria facilitates efficiency and consensus because it 
makes unstructured problems more tractable.  It insures that managers conduct “apples to apples” 
comparisons of the alternatives, and helps to surface underlying causes of disagreement.  Second, 
this practice establishes common ground and superordinate goals (Sherif, 1979).  Common 
objectives provide a means of resolving conflict and eliminating dysfunctional political behavior 
(Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1997; Hackman, 1990).   Third, well-defined criteria 
provide a structured means of evaluating different alternatives.  Managers develop an 
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understanding of a common reference point or yardstick (Russo & Schoemaker, 2002).  This 
prevents the problem of trying to “hit a moving target” during the decision process.   
Alternative Evaluation:  A Winnowing Process 
The high efficiency/high consensus groups did not try to choose directly from the entire 
set of options.  Instead, they identified many alternatives, and formed subgroups of similar 
options.  Then, they eliminated one or more subsets of options, and proceeded to evaluate the 
remaining alternatives.  For instance, in the SOF Decision, the chief executive described how 
they identified three types of alternatives, and then pared the list of options: 
“It was a winnowing process.  What we were doing was gradually taking things 
off the table.  In my mind, what you don’t want to keep doing in a decision 
making process is having to review all the alternatives over and over.  You’ve got 
to start taking alternatives off the table.  And so the first thing that went off the 
table was the ‘invest on our own’ strategy.  The second thing that went off the 
table was apparently people that were more publishing guys rather than technical 
authoring folks.  And then finally, we came down to the few technical guys.” 
Similarly, the CVP alliance decision came about through a “winnowing process”, as 
the Vice President of Engineering described:  
“The first thing was, do you want to play at all or not?  Second, do you want to be 
prime [contractor] or not?  Third, given you don’t want to be prime, you’ve gotten 
past that decision, who would you team with? That’s the hierarchy of things.” 
By contrast, I found that managers did not eliminate options systematically in the low 
efficiency/ consensus decisions, but instead, revisited the entire list of alternatives repeatedly.  
For example, on the LEV decision, managers discussed five alternatives for a long period of 
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time.  Eventually, they developed a comparative analysis, and settled on what one manager 
called a “mediocre compromise.”  Another executive described his frustration: 
“We went through this whole harangue and analysis of all the options… and I 
think at the end of the day, it was sort of a decision.  Maybe it’s a compromise. 
We kind of did a little of everything.”  
In other words, if we think of these problems as large decision trees, then it appears that 
groups employed two contrasting analytical strategies for “solving” the trees.  The more 
effective groups pruned branches off the tree systematically, while the others tried to analyze all 
of the tree’s endpoints simultaneously.  The latter strategy may be cognitively overwhelming, 
while the former appears to be a more manageable approach to alternative evaluation.   
The data in Table 5 suggest a relationship between the winnowing technique and the 
outcome variables.  Table 5 shows that none of the low efficiency/low consensus groups 
employed the winnowing technique, while two of the other three high efficiency/high consensus 
groups utilized this practice.  This evidence led to the following proposition: 
Proposition #2:  Managers achieve higher levels of efficiency and consensus 
when they eliminate subsets of options in a systematic manner rather than 
revisiting the entire list of alternatives throughout the decision process. 
This “winnowing” procedure enhances efficiency and consensus because it breaks a 
large, ill-structured decision down into smaller, more manageable pieces (Maier & Maier, 
1957).  It also makes the evaluation process more transparent, thereby enhancing decision 
understanding.  This transparency may enhance people’s perception of the fairness of the 
process (Kim & Mauborgne, 1997).  Finally, this approach builds momentum gradually rather 
than trying to move to closure in one giant step (Haspelagh & Jemison, 1989).   
Contingent Choices 
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The final type of intermediate choice occurs when managers make a tentative decision 
contingent upon specific events unfolding in the near future.  This differs from contingency 
planning (Janis & Mann, 1977) or “execution triggers” (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988), which 
managers employed in nearly all of the decisions. This approach identifies contingencies to be 
explored prior to implementation, while traditional contingency plans or execution triggers 
focus on different ways to react during implementation.  
For example, in the CVP Decision, a majority of the group wanted to serve as a 
subcontractor in a strategic alliance with a leading aerospace firm.  However, several managers 
had concerns about this choice. They would only support this decision if Vehicle Systems could 
secure an adequate share of future contracts.   Thus, managers made a tentative decision subject 
to certain conditions.   In less successful cases, managers sometimes identified a need for 
flexibility, but didn’t specify key contingencies clearly.  The more effective approach represents 
much more than a simplistic “keep your options open” mentality.  Note the specificity of the 
contingencies in the CVP Decision, as described by one executive: 
“What we want to do, if we can cut the right deal with AeroWorld., is have them 
prime and we will go sub provided that we get the content that we need. The 
content has to come in both technical merit content and dollar content. We took 
all the content in the vehicle. We rated it priority, 1 through 5.  If they said yes to 
all the must-haves, [and] if we get two or three of the number 2’s, we’d hit the 
25% [dollar content] target. The conclusion that we came to was that we would 
get all our #1 priority stuff, and we would get enough #2 priority stuff, to make up 
25% of the program. At that point time, I was preaching to the management team 
here [that] we ought to sign up.” 
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Managers employed a similar approach on the MOD Decision. They chose to make a substantial 
capital investment to modernize the facility presuming that they could secure financial support 
from the state, the city, and the U.S. Navy: 
“I think we said we are going to do this, but we are going to do this if we can get 
x, y, and z… We said we are going to do this, if we get this.  It was always 
contingent on certain events happening.” 
In some sense, this decision-making practice resembles a “real options” approach to 
strategy development (Kester, 1984; Luehrman, 1998).  A “real option” exists when firms have 
the ability to delay investments and decisions until they acquire additional information. In these 
situations, managers must “purchase” this option by making a small investment at the outset.  In 
the MOD Decision, the Director of Strategic Planning described the up-front investment: 
“[There was] a willingness to spend money up front, whether it’s on lawyers, 
environmental consultants, the construction manager, or on political consultants, 
communication people.  For us, we spent a fair amount of money on these things…it 
got some thoughts going, got the process moving and I just don’t think we could 
have done it on a few nickels and then said go.” 
  Managers did not employ this approach very often, but when they did, it yielded 
favorable results.  Table 5 summarizes the number of incidences of the “real options” approach 
in each condition.   Note that two of the three high efficiency/high consensus groups employed 
this technique, while none of the low efficiency/low consensus groups did so.  
Proposition #3:  Managers achieve higher levels of efficiency and consensus 
when they make a tentative choice, contingent upon the occurrence of specific 
events prior to implementation.   
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This “real options” approach to strategic decisions has many parallels to the concept of 
contingent contracting prescribed by negotiation scholars.  They have argued that contingent 
contracting enables parties to resolve disputes effectively (Bazerman and Gillepsie, 1999).  
Similarly, during group decision processes, the “options” approach leads to greater efficiency 
and consensus because it creates a way to bridge differences and break an impasse.   It helps to 
alleviate people’s concerns about a decision prior to committing to full-scale implementation.  
Moreover, this practice provides an opportunity for additional learning prior to a final decision, 
and allows managers to resolve uncertainty before moving forward in a definitive fashion.    
These three propositions suggest that the high efficiency/high consensus groups 
established certain parameters, narrowed their focus over time, and developed closure in stages.  
This series of intermediate choices enabled them to make progress and build momentum despite 
various cognitive and social-emotional obstacles that arose during the decision process.  It made 
a final solution more achievable, while simultaneously mitigating interpersonal tensions.  
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 
 Many scholars have found that political forces play a critical role in organizational 
decision-making (Bower, 1970; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1992).   
They have shown that managers engage in political behavior in order build support within the 
firm for their proposals.  This study’s findings focus on how managers often try to persuade 
others of the merits of their decision process in order garner support for a particular choice.  
Equal Access to Information 
 In this organization, managers typically gathered a great deal of information during a 
decision-making process.  Individuals used the information to support their arguments, justify 
assumptions, and persuade others to endorse their proposals.  Often, they presented extensive 
amounts of data to convince others that they had done a thorough investigation of the issues at 
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hand.  However, individuals employed two quite different approaches to disseminating that 
information prior to critical group meetings.  In some cases, managers provided each attendee 
with all available information prior to key meetings.  In other instances, managers provided some 
colleagues with more information than others.  In many cases, this occurred because individuals 
tried to “pre-sell” a few key executives on the merits of their proposals prior to meetings, and to 
build a coalition that would support them during the group deliberations.  To persuade these 
influential executives, individuals provided them with access to key data prior to group meetings.  
The failure to disseminate information to all participants prior to key meetings created 
perceptions of an unfair process.  During a group discussion, people felt disadvantaged if they 
were examining data for the first time, while others had reviewed it earlier.   Individuals also 
questioned whether their views and opinions were truly valued, if others had failed to share 
information with them.  In addition, participants wondered whether they could influence the 
opinions of those with privileged access to data, or whether these individuals had established 
strong preconceived notions about the issue prior to the group discussion.   
The RES decision illustrates the problem caused by unequal dissemination of 
information.  One executive shared data about various alternatives with only a few other staff 
members prior to a major off-site meeting.  When he did provide extensive data to the entire 
group, individuals were not impressed by the thoroughness of the intelligence gathering effort, 
but instead, felt as though he was presenting them with a fait accompli. The Vice President of 
Engineering explained what happened at the start of the off-site meeting: 
“We had an off-site meeting, and Dave tried to show the team that he had investigated 
all the options carefully.  Ron and I were the only people besides Dave who had 
examined the data at that point.  It became apparent very quickly to the rest of the 
staff, after they didn’t see me shrink like a violet in my chair, that I had seen the data 
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already.  So I’m a bad guy right away… I don’t think that this decision was pre-
ordained, but that’s what many people believed during and after that discussion, even 
to this day.”     
Similarly, in the LEV Decision, the Director of Strategic Planning noted that the group 
engaged in a series of unproductive meetings because people had been selectively disseminating 
data in order to pre-sell their proposals.  This caused individuals to become frustrated, and to 
question whether they could truly influence the direction of the group discussion.  By contrast, in 
the ALL decision, the strategic planners provided a comprehensive set of information about 
potential alliance partners to all participants.   In addition, individuals were asked to provide each 
other with any pertinent reports, white papers, etc. prior to group deliberations.  Naval Warfare’s 
CEO explained why this common database facilitated constructive debate:  
“If people disagreed about a potential partner, we would ask:  ‘Where are you coming 
from and why do you say that?  What’s your concrete evidence?’  One person might 
pull out this U.S. Navy report that described a weakness in a competitor’s 
technological capability.  Another might provide an analyst’s report that described 
how a recent acquisition improved those capabilities.   Everyone had access to these 
reports.  There were no games with the data.  It was an open process.”    
The data suggest that unequal distribution of information can inhibit a group’s ability to 
achieve efficiency and consensus.  Table 5 shows that all three of the high efficiency/high 
consensus groups provided equal access to information prior to key meetings, while only 1 of 
the 3 low efficiency/low consensus groups did so.  This evidence led to Proposition #4.   
Proposition #4:  Managers achieve higher levels of efficiency and consensus 
when participants have equal access to information prior to key group meetings.   
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 Unequal access to information before group meetings creates the perception that others 
only want to create the appearance of a fair and comprehensive process.  It also promotes the 
formation of factions within the group (haves vs. have-nots).  Finally, it discourages minority 
dissent, because individuals feel the pressure to defer to the “experts”, i.e. those who had more 
time to digest the data.  For these reasons, it has a negative effect on efficiency and consensus.  
Token Alternatives 
With respect to alternative generation, I found that the presence of “token” alternatives 
diminishes efficiency and consensus.  A token alternative is a proposal that draws a significant 
amount of discussion and analysis, but that is not ever seriously considered.  A token alternative 
differs from a “straw man” in an important way.  With a “straw man,” people understood that it 
would never be implemented.  However, they realized the value of discussing it as a means of 
stimulating critical evaluation and debate.  In the case of a token alternative, some individuals 
presented options that they never intended to consider seriously.  For example, in the inefficient 
SOF Decision, advocates of one course of action presented a number of token alternatives: 
“We did some internal analysis about who were the tool providers that we should 
team with.  We had a chart that said what we ought to do is team with a tool 
provider.  And we had a bunch of [alternatives] listed.  And to be honest with you, 
between Bill and I – it was a kind of a half-assed attempt, because we knew we 
wanted to go with ZTech.  But we were filling in the required work that said, 
would you go with Jet Corp.?  No, why not?  Would you go with Keytone Inc.?  
No, why not?  Would you team with AFile?  No, why not?  So we had that list.” 
This quote implies that managers felt compelled to offer multiple options to make the process 
appear thorough and analytical.  However, others perceived these efforts as manipulative: 
“I don’t think we looked at anybody seriously except for ZTech Corp.”   
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“This is pretty ordained from the first day.  They knew they were going to do this 
and this six months of…this has just been goofing around.”  
As Table 5 indicates, all of the high efficiency/high consensus groups managed to avoid 
token alternatives, while none of the low efficiency/low consensus groups achieved this feat.   
Proposition #5:  Managers achieve higher levels of efficiency and consensus 
when they avoid token alternatives during the decision-making process. 
In general, token alternatives create the perception that others are not considering all 
opinions seriously, and that individuals may be engaging in self-serving behavior.  They 
also may cause people to become disenchanted with the entire process.  For these 
reasons, token alternatives have a negative effect on efficiency and consensus.   
Advocacy and Analysis 
These managers employed formal analysis regularly.  In some cases, however, the primary 
evaluator or analyst also served as a strong advocate for a particular choice.  The advocate 
employed formal analysis to justify a course of action, rather than to evaluate all options.  These 
data suggest that efficiency and consensus suffer when advocates perform the evaluation.  For 
example, in the ORG decision, one manager described his perception of an advocate’s analysis: 
“His conclusion at the end of this was more…it was tilted toward what he wanted 
to say. It was his briefing.” 
Similarly, an Advanced Electronics executive described an advocate’s attempts to filter 
information and dominate the evaluation process on the SOF Decision:  
“As champion, he sold it.  He sold the concept that we had to have an alliance or a 
partnership.  Once the process started, it was relatively secretive.  I knew it was 
going on.  If I asked some pointed questions, I’d get some answers, but there were 
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no briefings, there was no discussion, there was no passing a document around for 
view, anything of that sort.” 
By contrast, some groups of decision-makers separated advocacy from evaluation. They 
invited third parties to provide objective analysis. These third parties often consisted of the 
firm’s strategic planners, its financial analysts, or external consultants.   An executive described 
the separation of advocacy from evaluation during the COM Decision: 
“I think that I was the spokesman for this effort.  I was its conduit to the staff... 
The Chief Financial Officer, obviously, his job was to see whether or not it made 
financial sense but I never gave him any data.  Well we gave him a couple.  I 
mean I could go back to my desk and we gave him projections, and he used to 
always have frustration with me that the projections weren’t very solid outside of 
three months from now.  There was a curve and it went this way and he’d say, 
‘Well, what underlies that?’ and I’d say, ‘I don’t know.’  I used to be embarrassed 
because I couldn’t provide an answer.  We couldn’t figure it out and that’s when 
Dan decided he was going to bring in a management consulting firm.” 
This evidence suggests that the use of formal analysis may not garner support for a 
proposal if others feel that a manager arrived at certain conclusions prior to performing the 
analysis.  This may occur when strong advocates serve as the primary evaluators of the different 
alternatives.   Table 5 indicates the number of cases in which groups separated advocacy and 
evaluation.  The following proposition emerges from the evidence regarding advocacy.   
Proposition #6:  Managers achieve higher levels of efficiency and consensus 
when they separate advocacy from evaluation, i.e. when a strong advocate for a 
particular position does not provide the primary evaluation of alternatives.   
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When groups fail to separate advocacy from evaluation, they allow individuals to present 
only analysis that confirms their existing position, rather than a balanced assessment of all 
options.  This inhibits the formation of common understanding.  Moreover, it creates the 
perception that people’s opinions are not being valued, and causes people to lose faith in the 
process.   If people don’t perceive the process to be genuine, they may withhold dissenting 
views, yet remain uncommitted to the decision (Janis, 1972).  Individuals also may refuse to 
provide the resources needed to implement the decision (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). 
 In sum, groups cannot achieve efficiency and consensus simultaneously if people 
perceive that they have not had equal access to information, and that they have been presented 
with inauthentic alternatives and analysis.  Groups must pay attention to how people perceive 
the behavior of those who present information, alternatives, and analysis during the process.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Scholars have described strategic decisions as complex, novel, open-ended, and ill-
structured (Bower, 1998; Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Hickson, et al., 1986; Mintzberg, et al, 1976; 
Murnighan & Mowen, 2002; Schweiger, et al., 1986).  Groups encounter two difficult challenges 
when they try to make these kinds of decisions. To reach closure, groups must overcome these 
obstacles, and ultimately agree on a choice that can be implemented effectively.     
My findings suggest that the three groups of managers that achieved high levels of 
efficiency and consensus overcame two obstacles more effectively than the other groups. One 
obstacle is substantive, while other is symbolic in nature.   First, complex tasks can overwhelm 
groups due to the cognitive limitations, or bounded rationality, of the decision makers (Simon, 
1976; Weick, 1984).  Thus, the substantive challenge is to make the choice more manageable.   
Second, while managers act in a boundedly rational manner, they often try to signal that they 
have employed a rational or comprehensive decision process.  They hope to enhance the 
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legitimacy of the process through signals and symbols (Feldman & March, 1981).    The 
challenge is to avoid the perception that advocates are engaging in certain behavior purely for 
symbolic reasons, without providing substantive contributions to the decision process (Ashforth 
& Gibbs, 1990).  As Figure 2 shows, the more effective groups employed two types of processes 
that enabled them to cope effectively with the difficulties of making ill-structured decisions.   
Insert Figure 2 about here 
The more effective groups made the choice manageable by gradually structuring the 
unstructured task.  In particular, these groups made a series of intermediate choices along a path 
toward sustainable closure.  They first determined how they would make their decision rather than 
focusing almost entirely upon what course of action to take.  They eliminated options as the 
process unfolded, and ultimately, made tentative choices contingent upon the occurrence of 
specific events.  In sum, they treated closure as a process rather than an event.   They did not seek 
closure in a single act of choice, but rather sought a series of  “small wins” that built momentum 
toward a final decision (Weick, 1984).  
The more effective groups also preserved the legitimacy of the decision-making process. 
As decision processes unfolded, these groups encouraged the gathering of extensive 
information, the generation of multiple alternatives, and the development of careful analysis.  
However, they discouraged the tendency to employ these practices for purely symbolic reasons.   
In the organizational sociology literature, procedural legitimacy refers to the perception that 
organizational techniques and processes are “desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).  
Feldman and March (1981) described the role of legitimacy in the decision process. They 
argued that rational decision-making methods have a symbolic as well as a substantive role in 
the decision-making process.  In particular, these scholars noted that,“using information, asking 
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for information, and justifying decisions in terms of information have all come to be significant 
ways in which we symbolize that the process is legitimate” (Feldman and March, 1981, p. 178).  
However, others have suggested that efforts to enhance legitimacy may be problematic 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).  In some cases, constituents may perceive attempts to legitimate 
processes as “manipulative and illegitimate” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 177).   Managers at 
this firm often gathered much data, considered multiple alternatives, and conducted formal 
analysis. These actions should symbolize intelligent and rational decision-making, and therefore 
bolster procedural legitimacy.  However, I found that individuals do not perceive all data 
gathering, alternative generation, and formal analysis in the same manner.  Interpersonal 
tensions arise if individuals perceive that they do not have a genuine opportunity to influence 
the final decision.  Unequal access to information, token alternatives, and advocate-driven 
analysis actually de-legitimize a decision process, and decrease efficiency and consensus. 
IMPLICATIONS 
This study’s findings imply that the more effective groups treated closure as a process 
that began to unfold even during the early stages of a decision.  When groups established 
evaluation criteria, they had begun to plant the seeds for a durable closure and a strong 
consensus.  They formed an important foundation of agreement, and yet they continued to 
engage in dialogue and debate about many alternatives and assumptions.  These groups did not 
treat closure as an event that occurred after a period of wide-ranging, creative, and open-ended 
brainstorming and debate.  They made progress toward closure by periodically making choices 
about elements of the problem, even as they continued to debate their differences. 
These findings provide new insights into how decision-makers employ simplification 
processes in order to solve complex problems.  March and Simon (1958) argued that individuals 
and groups engaged in satisficing behavior, because people’s cognitive limitations precluded the 
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use of rational-comprehensive analysis for many decisions.  Weick (1984) asserted that 
individuals and groups re-framed complex problems as “mere problems” in order to address the 
challenges of bounded rationality.  This research indicates that groups may employ a different 
form of simplification behavior as a means of making complicated decisions.  The effective 
groups in this firm employed a high level of comprehensive or formal analysis, and framed 
problems as large and urgent issues rather than as minor concerns.  However, they simplified 
complex decisions by seeking convergence and closure in small steps, through a series of 
intermediate choices made at key points during the decision-making process.  This 
simplification strategy enabled them to tackle complex, strategic decisions without sacrificing 
the comprehensiveness of their analysis and without minimizing the importance of the issue.   
This study also makes an important contribution by further developing the concept of 
procedural legitimacy as it pertains to organizational decision-making processes.  Feldman and 
March (1981) observed that “organizations systematically gather more information than they 
use, yet continue to ask for more” (Feldman & March, 1981, p. 171).  They argued that firms 
employ information for its symbolic value, as well as for its effect on decision quality.  In 
particular, gathering extensive amounts of information symbolizes that managers are engaging 
in a comprehensive decision-making process.   Feldman and March (1981) suggest that social 
norms emphasize the merits of rational or comprehensive decision-making.   Thus, gathering 
extensive information legitimizes a decision process.  This research suggests that other actions 
also may symbolize rational or comprehensive choice, and thereby bolster procedural 
legitimacy.  In particular, the utilization of formal analytical techniques and the generation of 
multiple options signify that managers are employing a thorough and logical decision process.  
Feldman and March (1981) emphasized the positive benefits of symbolic action in the 
decision process.  This study offers a different perspective, by suggesting that symbolic activity 
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may decrease procedural legitimacy.   For example, individuals may present a list of alternatives 
for purely symbolic reasons, rather than because they wish to generate an authentic debate and 
consideration of those options.  Others may perceive these options as “token alternatives”, and 
conclude that individuals are trying to manipulate the process.    If so, these attempts to enhance 
procedural legitimacy will actually de-legitimize the process (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).   
In sum, this research suggests that group members make critical attributions during 
decision-making processes.  Individuals attribute motives to others’ actions (Jones & Pittman, 
1982).  They may perceive information gathering, alternative generation, and formal analysis as 
authentic efforts intended to enhance the quality of the decision.  On the other hand, they may 
believe that others are trying to manipulate, “rig”, or pre-ordain the process.   If group members 
perceive self-serving motives on the part of others, they may become disenchanted with the 
decision-making process.   This hinders the group’s ability to achieve efficiency and consensus. 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Future research can build upon the findings presented here by addressing certain 
limitations of this study.  Future studies may also extend the framework developed in this 
research project, and explore some new questions that have emerged based upon this study.  
Addressing Limitations 
First and foremost, the data presented here suggests a series of propositions, but these 
hypotheses need to be tested systematically in future research.   Scholars may choose to test 
these hypotheses through additional field research or through experimental studies.  However, 
they need to be mindful of the differences between the laboratory setting and real organizations.      
Second, though I took steps to avoid recollection biases, future studies might avoid this 
problem altogether by examining decisions in real-time.   This represents a major challenge for 
researchers, because these processes unfold over long periods of time.  In addition, the processes 
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do not occur within the confines of a series of senior team meetings.  They comprise one-on-one 
and subgroup discussions involving people from different levels of the organization.   
Finally, this research took place within a large organization operating in a rapidly 
consolidating, yet somewhat stable industry.  Moreover, the company had a fairly analytical 
culture.  These factors may limit the generalizability of the findings.  Future studies could test 
whether these findings hold in entrepreneurial organizations operating in high velocity 
environments.   For instance, one might expect that entrepreneurial firms must act so quickly 
that they cannot afford to develop a series of agreements over time.  Therefore, entrepreneurial 
firms may employ other strategies for simplifying and structuring complex decisions.  
Extensions of this Research 
This research focused on how managers conducted decision processes after a problem 
came to people’s attention, but did not explore how issues became part of the firm’s strategic 
agenda in the first place.  Future studies should pay more attention to how managers initially 
recognize and diagnose problems.   Scholars should focus on how decision processes originate, 
and why managers choose to attend to certain issues and not others.   In the individual decision-
making literature, Klein (1998) has conducted some very insightful research on how fire 
commanders and naval officers make rapid decisions in the field.  He described how they utilized 
their experience to recognize situations, compare them to analogous incidents, and diagnose the 
problem quickly.  Little work has been done to understand similar processes within firms. 
Second, I did not focus much attention on the leader of the decision-making process.  
Retrospective reporting limited the extent to which I could uncover details about how the leader 
managed discussions.   However, some limited evidence suggested that the leader could occupy a 
very important role in shaping the context in which decision processes take place.  For example, 
in the ALL decision, the chief executive designed a process for evaluating the alternatives.  He 
 34 
suggested the use of multiple subgroups, and assigned himself as the Devil’s Advocate 
responsible for critiquing various proposals.  However, he did not participate directly in many of 
the deliberations.   Thus, he may have affected the outcome more significantly by shaping the 
context and designing the process than through substantive comments.  Real-time studies may 
offer additional insights regarding how leaders can influence outcomes through process design.   
Finally, a great deal of prior research has examined how managers can avoid faulty 
reasoning and enhance the quality of strategic choice (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Janis, 
1972; Russo & Schoemaker, 2002).  Future research must examine other decision outcomes and 
identify the tradeoffs that managers face among different objectives.  Many scholars contend 
that managers must make painful tradeoffs among competing objectives such as decision 
quality, commitment, and efficiency (George, 1980; Janis, 1989).  A few argue that effective 
managers must have the capability to overcome these tradeoffs.  They call for studies of “how, 
if at all, process outcomes such as decision quality, speed, and implementation are 
simultaneously achievable” (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 34).  This study begins to offer 
insight as to how managers avoid painful tradeoffs and accomplish these goals simultaneously. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Prior Research Findings 
 
 
 
Process 
 Efficiency 
 
Management 
Consensus 
 
Participation 
and 
Involvement 
 
Assertive leadership, 
consultation with a few trusted 
associates enhances efficiency. 
 
Broader participation and less 
directive leadership enhances 
consensus.  
 
Level of 
Conflict 
 
Level of conflict either slows 
pace, or has no effect at all on 
decision-making efficiency. 
 
Cognitive conflict has positive 
effect, while affective conflict 
has a negative effect. 
 
Political 
Behavior 
 
Politics takes time and effort, 
and therefore, decreases 
decision-making efficiency. 
 
Support-generating political 
behavior builds consensus during 
the decision-making process.  
 
Alternative 
Generation 
 
Breadth-Not-Depth strategy 
enhances efficiency. 
 
Breadth-Then-Depth strategy 
enhances consensus. 
 
Formal 
Analysis 
 
Real-time information fosters 
efficiency, while formal analysis 
and planning diminishes it.  
 
Formal analysis, systems, and 
procedures can help to build 
management consensus. 
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TABLE 2 
Situational Characteristic Survey 
 
 
Variable 
Name 
 
Variable 
Operationalization 
 
Items in 
Scale 
 
Eta  
Scores 
 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
 
Threat/ 
Crisis 
Likert-type scales measured the extent to 
which the decision was: 
• perceived as a crisis 
• required immediate action to address a 
highly critical problem 
•  involved a threat of significant financial 
loss 
• presented the possibility of a large 
competitive setback 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
0.33 
 
 
0.77 
Uncertainty Likert-type scales measured the extent to 
which there was: 
• uncertainty regarding the specific course 
of action required  
• uncertainty regarding the information 
needed to make a decision 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
0.22 
 
 
0.75 
Novelty Likert-type scales measured the extent to 
which the organization:  
• had faced decisions concerning a similar 
issue  
• was familiar with this type of decision  
 
 
 
2 
 
 
0.35 
 
 
0.76 
Time 
Pressure 
Likert-type scales measured the extent to 
which: 
• the organization faced time pressure on 
this decision  
• anticipated an event in the near future 
that constrained the organization’s 
timetable for making a decision 
• individuals faced time pressure during 
the decision-making process 
•  individuals felt constrained by schedules 
and deadlines  
 
 
4 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
0.80 
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TABLE 3 
Sample Profile 
 
Name of 
Decision 
Business 
Unit 
Type of 
Decision 
 
Description 
 
ALL Naval 
Warfare 
Strategic 
Alliance 
What firms should we form an alliance with in 
order to compete successfully on a major new 
U.S. Navy program? 
MOD Naval 
Warfare 
Capital 
Investment 
How should we modernize the shipyard 
facilities in order to enhance the efficiency of 
the ship assembly process?  
LEV Naval 
Warfare 
Capability 
Development 
How can we leverage the world class 
engineering capability throughout the 
corporation in order to improve ship design and 
engineering at the division? 
CVP Vehicle 
Systems 
Strategic 
Alliance 
What domestic and international firms should 
we team with in order to compete successfully 
on a new international combat vehicle 
program? 
ENG Vehicle 
Systems 
Strategic 
Alliance 
What firm should we team with in order to 
produce engines that are in high demand in 
international markets?   
NEW Vehicle 
Systems 
New Business 
Entry 
Should we enter a new segment of the combat 
vehicle market? 
ORG Vehicle 
Systems 
Organization 
Design 
What organizational structure should we 
employ to manage a newly acquired, highly 
entrepreneurial business?    
COM Advanced 
Electronics 
Organization 
Design 
How should we design an organization to 
commercialize a new technology created 
originally for defense applications?   
RES Advanced 
Electronics 
Business 
Restructuring 
How should we restructure the Advanced 
Electronics business in order to enhance 
profitability?   
SOF Advanced 
Electronics 
Strategic 
Alliance 
What firm should we team with to enhance our 
capability to develop and market a line of 
software products? 
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TABLE 4 
Survey Instruments 
 
 
Variable 
Name 
 
Variable 
Operationalization 
 
Source of 
Measures 
Items 
in 
Scale 
 
Eta 
Scores 
 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
 
Decision 
Under-
standing 
Survey defined six categories 
of concerns that may have 
influenced the decision.  
Respondents allocated 20 
points among the categories, 
using the point allocation to 
indicate the relative 
importance of the different 
concerns. 
Adapted 
technique 
employed by 
Bourgeois, 
(1980) Amason 
(1996); Dess 
(1987); 
Wooldridge & 
Floyd (1990) 
 
 
6 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
Commit-
ment 
Survey included questions 
that assessed whether people 
were “willing to see that the 
decision was properly 
implemented” and had 
“personally argued in favor of 
the alternative that became the 
final decision.”  
 
Utilized 
instrument 
developed by 
Amason (1996), 
based upon work 
by Wooldridge 
& Floyd (1990).   
 
6 
 
0.37 
 
0.90 
Efficiency Survey assessed the utilization 
of process iterations such as 
when managers “reconsider or 
reevaluate different options” 
or “revise the goals and 
objectives” as well as the use 
of resources such as “senior 
management time and effort” 
and  “middle manager time 
and effort.”  
Developed 
instrument based 
upon concepts 
introduced by 
Mintzberg, et al. 
(1976), Janis 
(1972); Harrison 
(1999); Trull 
(1967). 
 
10 
 
0.22 
 
0.81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
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Summary of Qualitative Data in Support of Six Major Propositions 
 
 
 High Efficiency/ 
High Consensus 
Low Efficiency/ 
Low Consensus 
High Efficiency/ 
Low Consensus 
Low Efficiency/ 
High Consensus 
 
Well-Defined  
Evaluation Criteria 
 
3 of 3 
 
0 of 3 
 
2 of 2 
 
1 of 2 
 
Winnowing  
Process 
 
2 of 3 
 
0 of 3 
 
1 of 2 
 
2 of 2 
 
Real Option/ 
Contingency Approach 
 
2 of 3 
 
0 of 3 
 
1 of 2 
 
1 of 2 
 
Equal Access to 
Information  
 
3 of 3 
 
1 of 3 
 
1 of 2  
 
1 of 2 
 
Avoidance of Token  
Alternatives 
 
3 of 3 
 
0 of 3 
 
1 of 2 
 
0 of 2 
 
Separation of Advocacy 
from Evaluation 
 
2 of 3 
 
0 of 3 
 
1 of 2 
 
1 of 2 
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TABLE 6 
Proposition Data for Each Decision  
 
  
Well-
Defined 
Criteria 
 
 
Winnowing 
Process 
 
Real Option/ 
Contingency 
Approach 
 
Equal 
Access to 
Information 
 
Avoidance 
of Token 
Alternatives 
 
Separation of 
Advocacy & 
Evaluation 
 
ALL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LEV No No No No No  No 
MOD Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
CVP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
ENG Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
NEW Yes No No Yes Yes No 
ORG No No No Yes No No 
COM Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
RES No No No No No No 
SOF No Yes No Yes No No 
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FIGURE 1 
Decision Categorization1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
  The efficiency measure is a z score (mean=0, standard deviation=1).    The consensus measure is a multiplicative function of 
the scores for commitment and understanding, and ranges from 6.54 to 26.15.    Efficiency and consensus are not highly 
correlated (Spearman correlation equals 0.28).   T tests indicate that the differences between the row and column means are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.     
 
Efficiency
Consensus
High
Low
High
Low
Col. Mean = -0.82 Col. Mean = +0.78
Row Mean
= +21.90
Row Mean
 = +11.40
-0.20
+21.54
+0.98
+22.13
+0.48
+17.37
-1.24
+7.42
E =
C =
E =
C =
E =
C =
E =
C =
MOD
SOF
CVP
ALL
COM
RES
LEV
ORG
NEW
ENG
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 FIGURE 2  
Conceptual Framework 
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